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Be Free? The European Union’s post-Arab Spring Women’s Empowerment 
as Neoliberal Governmentality 
 
HENDRIK HUELSS 




This article analyses post-Arab Spring EU initiatives to promote women’s empowerment in the 
Southern Mediterranean region. Inspired by Foucauldian concepts of governmentality, it 
investigates empowerment as a technology of biopolitics that is central to the European 
neoliberal model of governance. In contrast to dominant images such as normative power 
Europe that present the EU as a norm-guided actor promoting political liberation, the article 
argues that the EU deploys a concept of functional freedom meant to facilitate its vision of 
economic development. As a consequence, the alleged empowerment of women based on the 
self-optimisation of individuals and the statistical control of the female population is a form of 
bio-power. In this regard, empowerment works as a governmental technology of power instead 
of offering a measure to foster fundamental structural change in Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) societies.  The EU therefore fails in presenting and promoting an alternative 
normative political vision distinct from the incorporation of women into the hierarchy of the 
existing market society. 
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When thousands demonstrated for a greater say in their own governance in capitals across the 
Southern Mediterranean region in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, the European Union’s (EU) 
bustling activities to remedy its perceived weak political profile resulted in a review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the launch of a supposedly politicized ‘New 
Response to a Changing European Neighbourhood’ (European Commission 2011). Civil 
society actors play a central role in this declared new approach to democracy, political 
stabilisation and societal participation. In this regard, the EU emphasizes the importance of 
women as ‘drivers’ of reform processes in post-Arab spring societies. Therefore, the EU intends 
to empower women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by, for example, launching 
the ‘Spring forward for Women’ (SfW) initiative, a joint European Union – United Nations 
(UN) Women programme. While the EU’s focus on the economic empowerment of women is 
generally in line with the dominant concept of politicized development cooperation – assuming 
a spill-over from economic prosperity to political freedom – the implications of women’s 
empowerment as a governmental instrument are remarkably understudied. There is limited 
knowledge about what the EU’s external governance means for women in terms of 
empowerment in the post-Arab Spring era. Furthermore, we need a more refined theoretical 
conceptualisation of how to study the effects of empowerment as a governance instrument. 
Reconsidering the promised emancipatory potential of the empowerment tool designed to 
liberate women from (male) domination requires investigating the actual power dimension of 
empowerment. A number of studies argue that gender equality instruments actually only 
reconfigure power relations instead of contributing to significant economic, political and social 
change for women (see Oksala 2013). While these works draw attention to an important 
theoretical and empirical issue, the precise mechanisms and implications of empowering remain 
elusive.     
Building on Michel Foucault’s studies of governmentality (Foucault 2007, 2008, 2010), this 
article considers the following question: what kind of effects has women’s empowerment as a 
technology of governing? The article deploys the Foucauldian concepts of ‘bio-
power/biopolitics’ to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of empowerment as a 
technology of power. As I will argue, empowerment is part of a neoliberal governmentality 
targeting both individual women and the entire female population. In contrast to the 
overemphasis of women’s empowerment as an universal remedy for all societal problems in 
terms of underlining that empowerment ‘is a question of democracy and good governance’ and 
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‘part of the formula for economic progress’ (European Commission 2015: 4), this article 
considers the disciplinary and control features of empowerment at the core of neoliberal 
instruments. While the extensive debate over whether the EU is a ‘normative power Europe’ 
(Manners 2002) and a promoter of political freedom and democracy in the neighbourhood (see 
Kurki 2011; Malmvig 2006; Powel 2009; Teti et al. 2013) is predicated on the existence of pre-
defined political norms, the article shows that the EU’s approach to empowerment promotes 
the rationality of a market society that fills the political dimension with a logic of economic 
processes. The emerging, depoliticized female subjectivities obstruct the realisation of political 
and social reforms envisaged by feminism because it promotes incorporating women into 
existing hierarchical structures. The functional freedom at work in empowerment is different to 
a normative freedom that supposedly informs the EU’s external actions: while political freedom 
is optional, functional freedom is essential for neoliberal governance.  
The article particularly contributes to a theoretical-conceptual understanding of women’s 
empowerment as a contemporary instrument of the EU’s external governing in the southern 
neighbourhood. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the article strives to make 
intelligible the macro-structural causes and consequences of empowerment practices. The 
criticism provided by this article is directed at the (re-)production of domination and economic 
exploitation through the suggested empowerment approach. Nevertheless, I am aware that 
many of the analysed measures described are welcomed by participating women and might 
originate in the normative intention to improve the life of women in MENA countries. The 
perspective offered is therefore neither intended to reveal the ultimate truth about empowerment 
programmes, nor does it claim to be a privileged answer to the question of what is ‘best’ for 
women in the post-Arab Spring era. Instead, it analyses the power relations emerging in 
technologies of governing and the contingency of rationalities dominating specific conceptions 
of life as the basis of women’s empowerment. The objective of this article is hence narrower 
than feminist-normative studies in the sense that it considers the power of empowerment 
without promoting a specific emancipatory rationality. At the same time, it is broader in 
investigating the macro-political implications of women’s empowerment as an instrument of 
external governance.     
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the first section introduces the notion of 
governmentality and elaborates on how to understand women’s empowerment as a neoliberal 
technology of governing. The second section analyses the governing of gender in terms of 
biopolitics, targeting the construction of female economic subjectivities and the measurement 
4 
 
of the female population. The article concludes that the EU’s use of women’s empowerment 
fails to deliver on its promise of acting as a normative power in external relations. Instead of 
offering an alternative political rationality to the dominant neoliberal model of a market 
economy, it promotes the inclusion of women into existing hierarchies of male-dominated 
conduct based on bio-power.    
 
Governmentality: Neoliberal governing in practice 
Governmentality, as stated by Foucault, is ‘the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, 
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’ ( 2007: 
108). Governmentality therefore represents neither a coherent approach to governing 
populations nor a theoretical passe-partout to be applied to all facets of human practices. It is a 
perspective on interplaying rationalities as a ‘form of knowledge’ and technologies and 
techniques ‘as essential technical instruments’ developed in a specific socio-historical context. 
In this regard, Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality is first and foremost an 
investigation of government approaches in the transition from liberal to neoliberal government. 
What does analysing governmentality mean in this regard?  
Rationalities, as one aspect of governmentality, are social practices that discursively construct 
the means and ends of governing (Gordon 1991: 3; Merlingen 2006: 22; Rose and Miller 2008: 
29), while ‘technologies of government’ (Foucault 2007: 9; Miller and Rose 1990: 8) are 
approaches comprising techniques to assess, measure, report, quantify, or calculate. In general 
terms, governmentality as a ‘regime of practices’ (Foucault 1991: 75) represents the 
technological translation of assessments of governability into a common government language, 
often based on quantitative indicators and benchmarks (Larner and Le Heron 2004: 218). 
Conceptualising this connection between rationalities and technologies, governmentality 
studies intend to refrain from reproducing a sequential logic of stable knowledge shaping 
actions. Taking the ‘translatability’ (Rose and Miller 2010: 280) of rationality and the process 
of operationalisation through instruments seriously also means considering to what extent 
rationality emerges in technologies. Therefore, the unique contribution of studying 
governmentality does not lie in revealing an omnipresent, concealed, and pre-existing ideology 
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or ‘hidden governmentality’ (Kurki 2011: 360, 362) such as neoliberalism, but in systematically 
exploring specific neoliberal technologies and their effects. Therefore, the crucial added-value 
of studying governmentality is Foucault’s conceptualisation of power practices, targeting 
individuals and the entire population (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 133–135). 
In this regard, Foucault notes that technologies of power comprise ‘the disciplines of the body 
and the regulations of the population’ (Foucault 1990: 139), the latter being formed by 
‘regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population’ (Foucault 1990: 139 italics in original). 
While this could imply a differentiation between discipline and regulation as two types of power 
that represent a chronological sequence of developing government technologies, Foucault 
emphasizes that there are ‘diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and 
control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of “bio-power”’ (Foucault 1990: 140). 
Hence, bio-power is not solely reserved for studying the control, regulation and subjectification 
(subjectivation) of individual bodies, although the term seems to suggest just this. It is therefore 
important to note that the neoliberal governmentality of the present entails elements of 
regulation (of the population) and discipline (of the body) that now, however, have the form of 
an ‘action at a distance’ (Rose and Miller 2010: 278), distinguishing them from direct 
interventions. Furthermore, the productive and constitutive quality of power allows for 
investigating conceptions of neoliberalism, gender governance, or development policy beyond 
the ideological dichotomy of right or wrong. Analysing how ‘a regime of truth form[s] an 
apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power’ (Foucault 2008: 19) reveals the mechanism that 
produces ‘truth’ and links supposed ‘best practices’ to specific technologies of governing. In 
this respect, women’s empowerment should not merely be considered as an element of the 
neoliberal paradigm that fails to address the ‘true’ reasons for inequality and male domination 
but as a governmentality, a set of practices, that structures our understanding of how a ‘normal’ 
social reality and life ought to be.      
Although governmentality concepts allow for a thorough analysis of how women are 
‘normalized’ (Foucault 2007: 56–57) to conform to an optimal model, Foucault was widely 
criticized by feminist scholarship because he did not focus specifically on women or female 
subjectivities (see Amigot and Pujal 2009: 657–663; Deveaux 1994). While an elaborate 
discussion of the uneasy relation of Foucault and feminism is beyond the scope of this article, 
it should be noted that a body of studies have argued for the value of governmentality and bio-
power for analysing gender in governmental arrangements (Oksala 2013; Dean 2015; Foster 
2011; Munro 2003; Prügl 2015). Although Foucault has failed to explicitly consider the 
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situation of women, his take on bio-power as the basis of neoliberal governmentality opens 
promising avenues for research on gender. Oksala, for instance, shows how mainstream or 
popular feminism has largely adopted the neoliberal discourse of women’s responsibility to 
optimise in order to become competitive and successful in the market economy (Oksala 2013). 
While the mechanism of subjectification, making individuals to fit with the existing order of 
neoliberal governmentality, is similar for women and men, the rhetoric about the empowerment 
to Western ‘superwomen’ aims specifically at the (mostly economic) optimisation of women 
as a paradigm of development policy (see Hickel 2014).  
With regard to women during the Arab Spring, a substantial strain of research concentrates on 
the role of individual agency and various non-governmental groups during and after the 
uprisings, criticising that neither the domestic discourse in the affected societies nor the Western 
governmental or media discourse pays significant attention to the role of women (Lewinski and 
Mohammed 2012; McGarty et al. 2014; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013). Furthermore, studies highlight 
that the mainly Western dominated discourse has two distinct consequences: first, it promotes 
and reproduces an understanding of women as passive, apolitical and suffering, fundamentally 
lacking the potential for independent agency (Al-Ali 2012; Khalid 2015; Khalil, 2014; 
Moghadam 2014). Second, this discourse normatively overemphasizes the ‘like-mindedness’ 
and ‘modernity’ of women and their potential to modernize further according to Western 
standards (Sjoberg and Whooley 2015: 269). Moreover, while the promotion of gender equality 
and women’s empowerment (GEWE) is increasingly mentioned as an important external 
relations objective, the EU appears to be personally, conceptually and structurally ill-equipped 
to deliver on gender mainstreaming. Concepts of gender are poorly understood by responsible 
staff and neglected as operational priority. In that, a review report concludes that ‘[t]his is a 
systemic failure, with the EU’s GEWE commitments remaining as little more than rhetoric’ 
(COWI et al. 2015: ix). As a further assessment report commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of 
the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) noted in 2013, ‘despite 
the Commission’s overall policy commitment to mainstream gender equality (including the 
development of a specific toolkit), the analysis of the regional programmes’ documents shows 
that there is no evidence of a systematic integration of gender in the different interventions’ 
(Development Researchers’ Network (DRN) 2013: 60), particular with regard to the ENP 
South. In this regard, it is questionable to posit that ‘the EU has become a major gender equality 
promoter in the neighbourhood’ (Kunz and Maisenbacher 2015: 7), and the practice of women’s 
empowerment in MENA seems to prove once more the failure of the EU to implement a 
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comprehensive normative political agenda while the substantial economic adjustment 
programme widely criticized in relevant literature remains untouched (Bicchi 2011; Holden 
2011; Seeberg 2010; Freyburg et al. 2009; Kausch and Youngs 2009; Montanari 2007; Teti 
2012; Tömmel 2013; Bicchi and Voltolini 2013).  
The more fundamental problem, however, concerns the effects associated with the EU’s 
practice of empowerment. While the existing literature partly raises important points regarding 
the situation of women in MENA, it fails to problematize the power structure of empowerment. 
The promotion of empowerment as a default option for feminist studies often lacks reflexivity 
in terms of the role of agency and the different facets of freedom. For instance, research 
focussing on Euro-Mediterranean security relations as a gendered field argues for the 
‘promotion of individual and societal securities through empowerment’ as a possible solution 
to the ‘gendered power hierarchy’ (Bilgic 2015: 334). However, what if we consider 
empowerment as part of the neoliberal repertoire of development instruments, infusing the 
rationality of the market into the socio-political domain? The creation of the ‘neoliberal 
feminine subject’ (Oksala 2013: 40) as an ‘entrepreneur of the self’ (see Foucault 2008: 226) 
who internalizes success, failure, and optimisation as central categories of the neoliberal social 
model blurs the distinction between political norms and economic-societal normality. The 
decisive point is therefore neither whether women are constructed as active or passive nor which 
discourse is fostered or silenced – it is how agency and freedom are operationalized as a 
technology of power. The general tension between normative political expectations and the 
functional face of the Euro-Med cooperation is mirrored in asking whether economic and 
political empowerment are indeed two sides of the same coin. In other words, what is the 
rationality of empowering women in the EU’s approach? This points to the important role of 
the (feminine) subject in the deployment of empowerment as an instrument. As we will see in 
the following, freedom plays a decisive role in this context.     
    
Female agents for change? The EU’s practice of empowerment  
The different programme initiatives and actions meant to empower women in the Mediterranean 
are (partly) EU funded or coordinated by the EU and its regional initiatives such as the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM). They are often executed in cooperation with the UN, local NGOs 
and other institutions. While there is a plethora of activities, the aim of the analysis is not to 
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deliver a detailed and systematic account of the EU’s gender policy in MENA, which is beyond 
the scope of this article. Rather, it offers insights into the practice of women’s empowerment 
as an illustration of the theoretical conceptualisation, focussing on the two dimensions of bio-
power: the formation of economic subjects in terms of the empowerment to individual agency 
and the measurement of the female population. Before beginning this discussion, however, the 
following sub-section further substantializes the theoretical argument about the functionality of 
freedom.   
  
Empowerment to functional agency 
If I employ the word “liberal”, it is first of all because this governmental practice in the 
process of establishing itself is not satisfied with respecting this or that freedom, with 
guaranteeing this or that freedom (…) It is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can 
only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist (…) The new art of 
government therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the 
imperative: “be free”, with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may 
contain. The formula of liberalism is not “be free” (Foucault 2007: 63).  
Foucault’s words above illustrate that neoliberal governance requires functional freedom as a 
condition of operation. This implies that the existence and production of freedom is essential 
for governmentality arrangements. The functional freedom that is the cornerstone of neoliberal 
governing, however, is different from political freedom in that emancipation as well as social 
and political participation are absorbed by the population’s functional role in governmentality. 
A central concept in this context is ‘governing through freedom’ (Dean 2002, 2007; Walters 
and Haahr 2005: 44). Technologies work on the basis of various degrees of freedom, 
particularly in the arrangement of ‘advanced liberal government’ (Dean 1999: 164–165), in 
which the application of ‘technologies of the self’ (see Lemke 1997: 261–265) are central. The 
rationality of the neoliberal management of freedom primarily focuses on the optimisation of 
individuals and is linked to subjectification. Governmentality studies have argued that ‘the 
subject of expertise is now understood (…) as an individual who lacks the cognitive, emotional, 
practical and ethical skills to take responsibility for rational self-management’ (Rose and Miller 
2008: 106).  
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The widespread empowerment to functional agency is at the core of this reconfigured power of 
neoliberal governance. As Prügl argues ‘[b]ecause it helps produce free individuals, feminism 
contributes to the possibility of governing through freedom’ (Prügl 2011: 85). In fact, the 
empowerment of women is widely framed along the lines of economic empowerment, for 
example through so-called ‘smart economics’ (World Bank 2011; World Bank 2006). This 
approach has been criticized inter alia for shifting the responsibility for delivering on 
development goals to individual female actors, while neglecting structural reasons for the 
inequality, discrimination against, and poverty of women (Roberts and Soederberg 2012; Chant 
and Sweetman 2012). Nevertheless, the EU states in the 2015 Joint Staff Working Document 
that ‘[g]ender equality and girls’ and women’s empowerment are part of the formula for 
economic progress. Girls’ and women’s economic empowerment is a driver of development’ 
(European Commission 2015).  
Similarly, the UN’s Women’s Empowerment Principles, introduced on International Women’s 
Day 2010, ‘emphasize the business case for corporate action to promote gender equality and 
women’s empowerment and are informed by real-life business practices and input gathered 
from across the globe’ (UN Women 2016). What appears and is sold as strengthening the 
independence and socio-economic status of women through participation in the labour and 
financial market (e.g., through microfinance), however, often results in exposure to new 
economic-financial and social risks (Charness and Gneezy 2012; Maclean 2013; Marlow and 
Swail 2014; Roberts and Soederberg 2012). The concept of empowerment is therefore 
fundamentally concerned with enabling women to become more competitive and attain better 
positions in the existing hierarchy, a form of functional emancipation, for example, by 
promoting ‘education, training and professional development for women’ (UN Women 2016). 
Here, empowerment is based on an understanding of power as domination that can be simply 
overcome by striving for a higher degree of perceived independence.  
In sum, analysing women’s empowerment as a technology of governance should first consider 
the disciplining of individual bodies in neoliberal forms of self-optimisation, such as training 
and education. Second, it should consider the bio-political conduct of the female population 
with regard to control, assessment and evaluation. The following sub-section sheds more light 
on empowerment and the mechanism of optimising women to become ‘valuable’ economic 
subjects. 
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Empowerment and the training of economic subjects 
The Union for the Mediterranean and the ENP, the most important parts of ‘the system of 
governance created in EuroMed’ (Cardwell 2011: 221), are based on previous EU activities and 
a comprehensive acquis communautaire, which is otherwise promoted through the Union’s 
enlargement, stabilisation and association processes. Recent initiatives to promote gender 
equality and women’s empowerment in the southern dimension of the ENP rest on the pre-Arab 
Spring programme segments of EU-Mediterranean relations, established in the context of the 
1995 Barcelona Process. The empowerment of women was initially a priority theme in the 
EuroMed Five Year Work Programme adopted by the 2005 ‘Barcelona Summit of Heads of 
State and Government’. Following this summit, two ministerial conferences on ‘strengthening 
the role of women in society’ were held in the UfM framework in Istanbul in 2006 and in 
Marrakesh in 2009. The Third Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on 
‘Strengthening the Role of Women in Society’ was held in September 2013. 
The conclusions of the second conference focused on civil and political, economic, and cultural 
and social rights. The commitments notably emphasized inter alia the intention to ‘promote 
women’s entrepreneurship by (…) training and networking and encourage financial institutions 
to tailor products to women’s needs, in particular by providing micro-credit; promote modules 
to improve economic and financial management skills for women entrepreneurs, investing in 
women’s economic participation as “smart economics”; promote gender responsive budgeting’ 
(Union for the Mediterranean 2009: 5). The EU’s rationale for training economic subjectivities 
is therefore in line with the dominant approach to the empowerment of women in development 
cooperation, as represented, for example, by the aforementioned concept of ‘smart economics’ 
introduced by the World Bank’s Gender Action Plan entitled ‘Gender Equality as Smart 
Economics’ in 2006.  
How does women’s empowerment as a technology of power directed at individuals function in 
MENA? First of all, it aims at the integration of women into the labour market using a double-
track approach. This approach is based on a subjectification that feeds a Western-style 
leadership vision for a very limited number of women while offering basic training options for 
the majority. In this regard, the EU’s approach is a mixture of high-profile but low-scale 
initiatives and various basic skills education programmes. This can be illustrated through 
considering recent UfM initiatives to empower women (see table 1).  
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Table 1: UfM Women’s Empowerment Projects 
Project  Year 
Women’s Right to Health – The WoRTH Project 2016 
Promoting women’s empowerment for inclusive and sustainable industrial 
development in the MENA region 
2015 
WOMED: the “next generation of leaders” 2015 
Forming Responsible Citizens – Promoting citizenship education to prevent school 
violence, particularly against girls and women.  
2014 
Developing Women’s Empowerment  2013 
Skills for Success – Employability Skills for Women 2012 
Young Women as Job Creators  2011 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that UfM-coordinated programmes provide for a number of specialized 
training opportunities designed to qualify women and girls to become ‘the next generation of 
leaders’. Along similar lines, the two-week ‘WOMED Promoting women’s leadership’ 
programme offers short-training programmes at Sciences Po Paris for twenty-two young 
women. However, more often, EU-funded or -coordinated programmes only provide for basic 
employability skills. The ‘Skills for Success’ programme for instance, ‘will provide 
disadvantaged, unemployed, secondary-level educated women with the necessary skills, 
knowledge and tools to enter the labour market’ (Union for the Mediterranean 2016b). It is part 
of the ‘Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs (Med4Jobs)’ considered as UfM’s ‘flagship’ initiative.  
In theoretical regards, this idea of empowerment as training and optimisation precisely 
conforms to the neoliberal subjectification of the homo œconomicus as a rational actor. In 
Foucault’s words, ‘[h]omo œconomicus is someone who is eminently governable. From being 
the intangible partner of laissez-faire, homo œconomicus now becomes the correlate of a 
governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables’ 
(Foucault 2008: 270–271).  
The inclusion of women into the logic of the rational male actor, the Foucauldian ‘homo 
œconomicus as entrepreneur of himself’ (Foucault 2008: 226) characteristic of the gendered 
discourse of economic-financial success, is closely related to perceiving civil society as ‘a 
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concept of governmental technology’ (Foucault 2008: 296) and the place where the imagined 
rational actor performs self-optimisation. In fact, the UfM notes that female ‘entrepreneurship 
is an untapped source of growth, prosperity and poverty reduction, as well as being fundamental 
to women’s empowerment for creating more equitable societies’ (Union for the Mediterranean 
2016a). In this regard, the various ‘training opportunities’ offered to women, often delivered by 
NGOs as the recipients of EU funding, are at the heart of the EU’s civil society strategy. The 
EU notes that ‘[i]n the Southern Neighbourhood, civil society plays a key role in several 
countries in the implementation of social programmes funded by the EU (literacy programmes, 
care for children, gender equality, etc.)’ (European Commission 2014: 9).  
The professional co-optation of feminist movements on the basis of Western approaches to 
development and modernisation in the MENA region is what Jad referred to as ‘the NGOization 
of the Arab Women’s Movements’ (Jad 2003) more than a decade ago.1 In fact, civil society in 
terms of NGOs representing women’s interests is presented as the ultimate remedy for all 
problems associated with authoritarian government, corruption, lack of democracy, and gender 
inequality. Conceptualising a female civil society – in contrast to the male dominated state 
apparatus – as the primary location of economic activities inscribed in neoliberal 
governmentality, however, challenges its capacity to serve as a facilitator of political 
participation, cultural identity formation and public deliberation. This is similar to 
overemphasising civil society as a global democratisation concept on the inter-state level (see 
Bartelson 2006). 
The fact that the current funding of women’s empowerment implemented by local NGOs does 
not take place on ‘a clean slate upon which to remould social relations through the ending of an 
abusive authoritarian regime’ (Johansson-Nogues 2013: 405) as suggested by some, further 
aggravates the situation. The often criticized state-centric approach of the pre-Arab Spring ENP, 
which mainly used governmental channels to fund activities and hence relied on cooperation 
with the authoritarian regimes (Tassinari and Holm 2010; Bicchi 2006), is continued through 
funding practices that stabilize the existing influence of ‘state-sanctioned women’s groups (…) 
bound up with the nationalist agendas that co-opted feminist agendas insofar as they could serve 
the state’s purpose’ (Khalid 2015: 167). 
In the MENA context, considering civil society as a homogenous arena of Western-likeminded 
dissidence ignores the diversity of interests and actors and leads to a continuation of the pre-
Arab Spring governmental conduct of civil society as a state-controlled project of pseudo-
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democratisation. While the putatively reformed approach of ‘A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood’ (European Commission 2011) adopted in the heyday of the Arab Spring 
promised a central role for civil society, the EU even failed to consult with NGOs in the MENA 
region during the document’s drafting process (see Oxfam International 2011). Moreover, 
including the empowerment of women within this model of civil society transfers the logic of 
economic rationality onto them. As aforementioned, the construction of women as the primary 
measure of governmental interventions, entailing the expectation, education and actual training 
to become homines oeconomici, has crucial implications for the processes of subjectification 
and agency formation taking place in an institutionalized civil society. While the situation of 
women in terms of socio-economic and civil-political rights is certainly problematic in MENA, 
their empowerment to functional agency merely substitutes the dominance of disciplinary 
power with the more diffuse and self-inflicted power relations of neoliberalism as the ideal of 
a Western-style modern society. Empowerment essentially transfers the responsibility for a life 
of ‘success’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘resilience’ to the individual level. In this respect, the state 
or society is not to be held accountable for any failures of women to optimise or use their 
‘freedom’ effectively and reasonable.  
Furthermore, as of August 2016, the UfM programme ‘Med4Jobs’ (see table 1) supported 
twelve projects carried out by NGOs in different MENA countries, for instance. The 
programme is inter alia funded by PepsiCo, thereby raising the question of whether such 
initiatives only reinforce the widespread problem of ‘the feminization and informalization of 
labour’ (UNRISD 2005, 67) in the sense of expanding of low-wage work, while women (and 
men to a lesser extent) are merely trained to provide a pool of cheap labour in those countries 
targeted by global companies. If women entered the structurally inefficient labour market in 
MENA countries in significant numbers, pressure on wages and employee rights would 
certainly increase. In this scenario, ‘employability’ as an objective of empowerment initiatives 
is a synonym for ‘governability’ based on the politics of truth about accepting one’s role in the 
globalized economy, shaping conceptions of what a ‘normal’ life and economic existence ought 
to be.           
Nevertheless, the rationality of empowerment as a technology of economic governance 
enabling the exploitation of women’s economic potential is widespread. In September 2015, 
the ‘Spring Forward for Women’-funded ‘Arab Women Economic Empowerment Network’ 
(Khadija) was launched to foster the participation of women in the labour market, aiming at 
promoting economic growth. In the words of Mohammad Naciri, Regional Director of the UN 
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Women Regional Office for the Arab States, ‘[t]he region has made significant investments in 
women’s education in the last decade. However, the return on investment is still under-utilized 
due to their limited economic participation (…) Through this network, we are more capable of 
maximizing our region’s human resources and capturing opportunities for growth’ (Spring 
Forward for Women Programme 2015a). The specific power-knowledge relationship of the 
neoliberal governmentality of MENA women’s empowerment is therefore predicated on 
constructing the ‘desire’ for success (see Hickel 2014: 1367), measured against the Western 
model of the ‘business case’ for empowerment, channelling the modernisation of the self to 
gain access to the advanced labour market.  
Empowerment as a technology of power provides for a governmental disciplinary instrument 
in the Foucauldian sense that trains and controls individual female bodies. The concept of 
employability safeguards governability in two ways: first, it allows for the potential integration 
of women into an existing structure of male-dominated labour based on the governing of the 
self if women accept their offered roles, either as ‘future leaders’ or as ‘economic misfits’ to be 
optimised. First, this reinforces existing hierarchies and structural inter- and intra-gender 
inequalities, as well as the logic of competition. Second, it is an instrument of political 
stabilisation that sells economic incentives in terms of a putative career or an additional income 
source as evidence of reform. The rationality that emerges in these practices emphasizes growth 
as a central neoliberal paradigm. The EU clarifies that women’s empowerment and ownership 
‘can also contribute to stronger and more inclusive economic growth that benefits society as a 
whole (…) closing the labour force gender gap by 2030 could yield a potential average gain of 
12% to the size of the total economy across OECD countries’ (European Commission 2015: 8). 
Therefore, GDP growth is presented as the key objective of development policies implemented 
by the EU and national governments as well as actors such as the UN. Overemphasising growth 
and free market societies becomes an important vehicle of realising empowerment, understood 
solely as gaining access to the labour market (and the financial market in terms of microfinance, 
for instance). This understanding of empowerment, however, is structurally averse to demands 
for social equality, welfare reforms, and fundamental political-systemic change. In this sense, 
the truth constructed by the EU’s women’s empowerment programmes presents societal 
problems and solutions only in economic terms. The highly complex issue of gender and 
women’s equality is operationalized and thereby simplified by economic indicators such as 
GDP. This means that the sphere of politics is colonized by economic rationalities and is pushed 
to the individual level, portraying women as responsible for their own fate.              
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The marketisation of the political sphere (see Foucault 2008: 131) therefore also has 
implications for the promotion of fundamental norms such as human rights, a key objective of 
the EU in the southern neighbourhood. Reframing the political in economic terms means that 
norms of individual freedom are understood as functional rights that ensure a certain degree of 
liberty necessary to act as an entrepreneurial subject. In this regard, gender equality is 
reconstructed by technologies, such as empowerment, as a normative principle protecting the 
status of women as a functional element in the market economy while reproducing existing 
social inequalities. The Commission identifies ‘[p]romoting the economic and social rights / 
empowerment of girls and women’ (European Commission 2015: 4) as one of four pivotal areas 
of gender empowerment and women’s equality in its most recent working document. This not 
only indicates the absence of political empowerment as a strategic priority, but it also 
emphasizes a dichotomy between economic and social rights that materializes in the rationality 
of empowerment promoted by the EU. This basically risks degrading basic civil and political 
rights in favour of building a vague framework to be filled with economic requirements and 
desires.  
Transferring economic principles and methods to normative issues such as gender equality and 
women’s empowerment is also perceptible in the second dimension of bio-power, the 
assessment of populations. The following sub-section considers this as the second layer of the 
EU’s biopolitical governing of women as a distinctive group in MENA countries. 
Biopolitics and the measurement of the female population 
As argued in the conceptual section, the bio-power of neoliberal governmentality emerges as 
the interplay between the disciplinary formation of individuals and the control, assessment, and 
evaluation of an entire population. The measurement of women’s empowerment and gender 
equality is rarely considered in this context, although the statistical evaluation of all aspects of 
life is at the core of biopolitical control. These evaluations, and the resulting ‘governing by 
numbers’ (Grek 2009; see Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte 2012), are the most fundamental 
techniques of ‘government at a distance’ (Rose and Miller 2008: 34). The practice of actors 
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN and 
relevant evaluation units are particularly important for development policy. There are 
tendencies to harmonize and share ‘best practices’ of evaluation, facilitated by institutions such 
as the DAC Evaluation Resource Centre (DEReC), a global network hosted by the OECD as a 
subsidiary body that ‘serves as a platform for learning and co-ordination, and enables members 
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to work together to improve the quality of evaluations and harmonize evaluation processes’ 
(OECD 2010: 1).  
Measurement is part of empowerment as a technology of power in two regards: first, the 
allocation of EU funds, for example, through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
(ENI), requires a system of benchmarks and indicators to evaluate success. The EU has not yet 
developed a fully-fledged evaluation approach for GEWE (see COWI et al. 2015), but 
introducing measurable objectives and indicators has become a key target (European 
Commission 2013). Transferring the existing technical framework to the dimension of GEWE 
will further strengthen the functional perspective of ‘modernising women’ (Moghadam 2014) 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This means that the perceived success of technologies such 
as the empowerment of women through lending, particularly if it is measured in numerical 
terms, simplifies the complexities of social power-relations. For example, whether an increase 
in the number of women using micro-finance instruments or a low loan loss rate is actually a 
success is less clear than it might seem. Novel risks and vulnerabilities induced by instruments 
such as microcredits often remain undetected. This is what Engle Merry and Wood call ‘the 
paradox of measurement: to make something known it must be countable, but if it has not 
already been translated into commensurable and quantifiable terms, it is difficult to count and 
may remain unnoticed and uncounted’ (Merry and Wood 2015: 205). The implications of 
approaches to measurement such as the Women’s World Banking ‘Gender Performance 
Indicators’ (Women’s World Banking 2015) as part of the empowerment to putative financial 
responsibility and independence should be reconsidered in this regard.  
Furthermore, the EU’s functional concept of agency leads to allocating funds only to those 
initiatives that fall within the underlying margins of efficiency, economic progress, and 
neoliberal reform. This also means that women who do not fit into the concept of functional 
agency are constructed as passive, weak and dependent subjects that are either willing to be 
optimised or left out of major funding schemes if they have a different understanding of their 
role.  
Second, measurement is part of the dominant politics of truth regarding conceptions of a normal 
woman’s life. Foucault provided a conceptualisation of the mechanisms of measurement in the 
‘apparatuses of security’ (Foucault 2007: 57) that emerged with the administrative expansion 
of government and which he distinguishes from the disciplinary normalisation targeting 
individual bodies. The aim is now to produce statistically informed understandings of the 
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‘normal distribution’ and the ‘operation of normalization consists in establishing an interplay 
between these different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable 
in line with the more favorable’ (Foucault 2007: 63). In other words, the statistical evaluation 
of women’s empowerment produces quantitative indicators that are compared to the ‘normal’ 
distributions represented by the Western optimum. The key to biopolitical assessment is hence 
the construction of indicators and reporting techniques.  
In the Annex of the Joint Staff Working Document, the EU emphasizes that ‘[i]n order to ensure 
consistent and rigorous application of reporting methodologies and indicators, the Commission 
services and the EEAS will develop detailed guidance’ (European Commission 2015: 18). 
Moreover, the document provides a detailed table that gives clear examples of how the EU’s 
reporting system works with respect to women’s empowerment. It is apparent that the impact 
assessment is strongly focused on efficiently obtainable data such as the ‘number of job 
descriptions that contain gender equality as an area of responsibility’, the ‘number of 
programme evaluations per year that include an assessment of impact on women and girls’, the 
‘percentage of results disaggregated where relevant by sex in Results Framework(s)’, the 
‘number of research projects co-financed by EU (EUD/MS) on gender related issues’, the 
‘number of projects building awareness of local and national media on gender issues in partner 
countries and supported by EU’, the ‘number of EU delegations awarded Gender Awards’, the 
‘number of honour killings’, or the ‘percentage of women aged 20-24 years old who were 
married before their 18th birthday’ (European Commission 2015: 20–25, 42). Whether these 
indicators indeed ‘provide an indication of progress’ or ‘allow for indication of EU 
contribution’ (European Commission 2015: 42) is questionable considering the limited 
conception of GEWE they construct. Furthermore, any evaluation based on these indicators 
only measures specific situations as the outcome, leaving processes unconsidered; it also lacks 
a clear understanding of causality between means and ends.   
Although the EU argues that it intends to ‘[invest] in, and [use], systematic high quality gender 
evidence and analysis to contextualize and tailor approaches to the specific social, political and 
demographic characteristics of the partner country where the EU operates’ (European 
Commission 2015: 14), these indicators appear as another example of the EU’s ‘one size fits 
all’ (Bicchi 2006) approach, widely criticized in the EU’s Mediterranean policy (Tassinari and 
Holm 2010; Haukkala 2008; Tömmel 2013; Browning and Joenniemi 2008). This contrasts 
with the ENP’s central paradigms of ‘joint-ownership’ and ‘differentiation’ that are also 
reproduced in the SfW documents, underlining that the programme is ‘building on local 
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initiatives in selected countries, with the recognition that sustainable change must be locally-
owned and led’ (UN Women 2015). 
Considering the biopolitical conception, measuring the female population based on such 
indicators is important to understanding the construction of a normal life. These evaluations 
and the resulting statistical distributions of the normality of women in MENA countries are 
measured against a pre-existing Western normal or optimal model. Statistical results that are 
assessed by the EU as unfavourable are discursively linked to macro-economic indicators such 
as GDP growth and establish the basis for the ‘processes of progressive training (dressage) and 
permanent control’ (Foucault 2007: 57) targeting individual female bodies.  
The interplay of the individual and population level as fields of bio-power is also obvious with 
regard to the EU’s construction of a rationality of family and reproduction compatible with the 
neoliberal vision of economic productivity. In this regard, the technology of women’s 
empowerment serves neoliberal governmentality by increasing female productivity as an 
element of economic growth. Whereas the subjectification of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ is 
well-covered in relevant literature, the specific targeting of women in the development 
approaches of major actors introduces a novel set of implications. The biopolitical control of 
women based on essentialist concepts links women to questions of family planning and 
reproduction as influencing their functional role. The deployment of GEWE as an EU 
instrument of biopolitical control has been researched in the domestic context of European 
states. Repo argues that the EU ‘expects women to replace the retiring male workforce by 
joining the labour market whilst at the same time reproducing the next generation of wage-
earners’ (Repo 2014: 16). While gender politics in the most developed Western countries 
mainly aim at counteracting the perceived demographic challenge of ageing populations and 
declining birth rates, the situation in MENA and developing countries in general is constructed 
in adverse terms. Here, the problematisation is centred on the link between population growth, 
(youth) unemployment, and the traditional family as obstacles to fully tapping the economic 
resource of women. At the same time, population growth is considered as one of the primary 
reasons for unemployment and political instability in the MENA region.  
This understanding is widespread in political discourses. For instance, a report by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of NATO on the ‘youth bulge problem’ in MENA countries concluded 
that ‘NATO must increasingly strengthen and expand the political links and partnerships in the 
MENA region to stave off the dangers of instability which a youth bulge might bring to the 
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populations of the NATO countries if its potential is not adequately tapped’ (NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly 2010: 13). The ‘securitisation’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998) of 
the ‘youth bulge problem’ is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the underlying 
rationality of problematising birth rates, sexuality and female roles in Arab states forms a 
dominant development discourse. For example, a report for the United Nations Development 
Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, concluded with regard to ‘[a] history of high 
fertility in the Arab region’ that ‘[t]he reduction of high fertility and increases in the working-
age population can create opportunities for economic growth if the right mix of educational, 
health, and labor-market policies are in place’ (Mirkin 2013: 7).  
Likewise, the EU clearly promotes a rationality that constructs a tension between existing 
conceptions of family and reproduction and participation in the market society. It emphasizes 
that ‘[i]ssues such as reconciliation between family and work are crucial to unlock women’s 
economic potential and contribution to development’ (European Commission 2015: 7). At the 
same time it highlights that women ‘lack the knowledge required to make sexual and 
reproductive decisions responsibly’ (European Commission 2015: 5). With regard to Egypt, for 
instance, the ENI Programming document notes that ‘Egyptians are suffering from a weak 
economy, growing joblessness and increasing poverty and vulnerability (…) with a still very 
high annual population growth rate of 2.8% in FY13 [Financial Year 2013], inclusion remains 
a multidimensional challenge for the Egyptian economy’ (European Commission 2013b: 4). 
This means that the EU constructs a twofold truth about reproduction: first, pre-modern family 
sizes and models obstruct the access of women to the labour market, which is linked to 
unsatisfying economic growth rates. Second, women lack the necessary knowledge to self-
govern their reproductive behaviour and require training to optimise to modern Western 
standards. I do not argue that reviewing and improving the health care dimension in MENA 
countries is irrelevant, but I stress in this context that the empowerment of women is presented 
as realized by acquiring a specific version of freedom, knowledge and life-style. This 
constructed truth about a woman’s ‘normal’ life emerges in women’s empowerment as a 
technology of power and serves to silence any alternative rationalities of the self potentially 






The EU’s rhetoric about a new political approach as a response to the Arab Spring raised 
expectations that the EU’s neighbourhood policy would intensify its political liberal-normative 
influence in the Mediterranean region and contribute to the political empowerment of women. 
This article argues that empowerment is not an instrument of liberation but a technology of 
neoliberal governmentality that empowers women with functional agency. The emerging 
rationality of individual freedom based on the formation of economic actors ‘free’ to operate 
within the set margins of a market society reproduces structural hierarchies and power relations. 
While it is conventionally stated that ‘men’s freedom (privilege, etc.) is contingent upon 
women’s unfreedom’ (Deveaux 1994: 236), the perspective on empowerment as an instrument 
of governmentality moves beyond the dichotomy of freedom and unfreedom.    
Empowerment as technology of bio-power operates on two dimensions by disciplining 
individual bodies and controlling the population: first, the subjectification of women as 
economic subjects incorporates women into the basic rationality of governing through freedom. 
The indirect action at a distance works through the governing of the self – women are supposed 
to internalize the overall Western rationality of modernisation, self-optimisation, and education 
that is fundamental to the EU’s programmes. While these measures might be welcomed by 
women and can improve their immediate socio-economic status, underlying structural factors 
of (social) inequality, gender division, and domination remain untouched. Furthermore, 
economic techniques such as microfinance expose women to novel risks and power-relations. 
Second, the empowerment of individuals interacts with the measurement of the female 
population in MENA countries. The article demonstrates that the rationality of statistical 
assessment and the governing by and of numbers in particular aims at enforcing a vision of 
empowerment based on the Western average ‘normal’ woman. This is closely connected to the 
biopolitical assessment of population and labour statistics that constructs a connection between 
family size, low participation of women in the labour market, and economic development.         
In the context of the overall debate of the EU as a putative normative power, the study of 
women’s empowerment also shows that programmes such as the ENP, Spring forward for 
Women, or the UfM’s initiatives are the external effects of rationalising governmental 
processes that originate in the historical development of Western models of government. The 
‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 2001: 131) constructing the rationality of a modern and optimised 
women finding her place in the global economic structure promoted by the EU is a de facto 
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continuation of ‘orientalism’, constructing a ‘reality whose structures promote the difference 
between the familiar (Europe, the West, us) and the strange (the Orient, East, them)’ while 
constituting ‘a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought’ (Said 2003: 42) that silence 
alternative practices of female agency in MENA societies. The dominance of technical-
functional cooperation constructs a narrative about so-called best practices for reforming 
societies and individuals in the Southern neighbourhood, containing a ‘truth’ about self-
entrepreneurial empowerment as the only reasonable form of freedom. Deploying technical 
instruments is the ultimate power of normalisation that is nevertheless alien to promoting 
classical political liberalism in the EU and abroad. As a consequence of the global process of 
normalising conduct, the design, suitability, and context of applying the technology of 
empowerment remains unconsidered. The widely reproduced rhetoric about normative power 
Europe is more than the mere discursive legitimisation of rule: it becomes the very basis for 
implementing the technocratic dimension of neoliberal governance that is not about the vision 
of freedom it putatively promotes. Regardless of whether the ENP is actually meant to 
strengthen democratisation and individual rights, the EU’s approach to empowerment 
predisposes it to promote functional agency merely flanked with basic rights, guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of governmental interventions. Even if the EU promoted understandings of 
women’s empowerment that were not linked to efficiency, exploiting human resources, and 
economic growth, even if it developed new concepts of conduct to reconcile functional 
necessities and normative needs, it would still reproduce those power-relations inherent to the 
formation of individuals and the measurement of populations as long as it applies neoliberal 
technologies of government. 
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